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I

n 1743, when Benjamin Franklin announced the formation of an
American Philosophical Society for the Promotion of Useful
Knowledge, it was important for the citizens of Pennsylvania to know
more about their American Indian neighbors. Beyond a slice of land
around Philadelphia, three quarters of the province were still occupied
by the Delaware and several other Indian tribes, loosely gathered under
the wing of an Indian confederacy known as the Six Nations. Relations
with the Six Nations and their allies were being peacefully conducted in
a series of so-called “Indian Treaties” that dealt with the fur trade, threats
of war with France, settlement of grievances, and the purchase of land.
Franklin’s Treaties
Franklin played an important part in Indian affairs in colonial and
early federal America, particularly with regard to Indian treaties. The
minutes of 13 of these treaties, from 1736 to 1762, amounting to about
300 pages, were printed in folio by Benjamin Franklin’s press. A
magnificent volume of facsimile reproductions under the title Indian
Treaties Printed by Benjamin Franklin was issued in 1938 by the
a
b
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Historical Society of Pennsylvania, using copies of the treaties provided
by several institutions, including the American Philosophical Society,
which held the largest number. It was edited by Julian P. Boyd, who
would become the first editor of the papers of Thomas Jefferson and
later President of the Society (1973–6). These treaty pamphlets might
be regarded as the first items acquired for the ethnological collections
of the Society. They are the 18th century equivalents of 21st century
videotapes, capturing, as Carl Van Doren, Pulitzer-prize winning author
of the classic biography of Franklin and also a member of the Philosophical Society, observed in his appreciation of the treaties as a literary
genre, the reality of live events in a bygone age. Franklin remarked
more pragmatically that the treaties should be of public interest because
they showed “the method of doing business with these barbarians.”1
I have a vision of the first Indian treaty in which, however, it is the
English who are the barbarians. I see a group of Indians, standing on
the shore of what we now know as the Atlantic Ocean, staring eastward at some Unidentified Floating Objects (UFOs) rising up from the
waters that surround the world. These vessels come closer and disgorge
small boats, and from them strange human beings land, with hairy
faces and funny clothes, speaking to each other in an incomprehensible
language. What to do with these aliens? Let’s light a fire and sit down
and try to talk with them and somehow find out who they are and
what they are doing here. So they gather around a council fire and the
Indian spokesman says calmly, in Mohawk, “We are Haudenosaunee.
What is your Nation? Perhaps we are Cousins.” The White Captain
stands up, stabs his sword into the sand, and yells into the sky, in
English, “I claim this land in the name of His Christian Majesty, King
James.” Then he turns to the Indian speaker and says, “Who’s in charge
around here?” This was a meeting between an egalitarian society based
on kinship and a hierarchical society based on authority. As time went
on, there were more and more close encounters between the British
visitors and the Six Nations, sometimes friendly, sometimes not, and
both sides realized that there had to be a better way to communicate.
The “treaty” was the mode in which the Indians and the Europeans
learned to talk to each other.
Protocol
By Franklin’s time, a treaty protocol had been developed that both
sides generally accepted. This protocol was based on the British definition of Indian tribes as sovereign nations governed by central councils
of chiefs. The concept of “Indian nation” was the most critical, and
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ultimately the most vulnerable, element of the protocol. Indispensable
also were the use of bilingual interpreters and a mutually respectful
sharing of diplomatic etiquettes. Shared protocol made possible agreements on substantive issues, including the highly profitable fur trade;
the settlement of grievances; the purchase of Indian land; and, as
always, the firming up of the indispensable alliance between the Six
Nations and the British colonies in the persistent conflict with the
French in Canada.2 Pennsylvania’s version of treaty protocol was
derived from mid-17th century New York, which on behalf of all the
British colonies treated exclusively with the Six Nations Confederacy
and, through that body, their tributary nations. It was Iroquois custom
that shaped the proceedings in conformity with their traditional
manner of conducting “publick Transactions with other Nations.”3
Printing the Indian treaty of 1736, and subsequent Pennsylvania
treaties, was a public service of Franklin’s, attendant upon his service
as clerk and, after 1751, as a member of the provincial Assembly. The
developing confrontation between French and English interests in the
Ohio country directed public attention to the need to better understand
the government of the Six Nations. Franklin’s Treaties were, in their
time, the most extensive presentation in English of Iroquois political
practices and no doubt served as a guide to protocol for colonial
officials engaged in Indian affairs. After the Lancaster Treaty of 1744,
which was required to settle a bloody skirmish between Iroquois
warriors and Virginia frontiersmen before a general frontier war broke
out, Thomas Lee of Virginia wrote to Conrad Weiser, the Pennsylvania
interpreter asking for background information about the Iroquois.
Weiser’s correspondence with Lee, outlining Iroquois customs in
religion, war, and marriage were published in part in Virginia and in
Pennsylvania by a German language newspaper. Weiser’s sketches of
Iroquois ethnology came to the attention of Benjamin Franklin, who
published an excerpt. But Weiser’s account of the structure and
procedures of the Confederacy was brief.
And there was not much else yet in print, except for Franklin’s
Treaties, in the way of useful knowledge. A friend and associate of
Franklin’s, Lewis Evans, published several reasonably accurate maps of
Indian tribal locations in the British colonies, accompanied by a survey
of the province of Pennsylvania that contained some information on
Indians. The details were probably provided by Weiser and another
Philadelphia scientist, John Bartram, who accompanied Weiser on trips
to Indian country and later published a book on the subject. William
Penn himself had published, as early as 1683, an account of the Indians
of his province, but the description of political matters was limited to
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treaties for the purchase of land from local Delaware (Lenni Lenape)
“Kings.” Cadwallader Colden, an experienced Indian commissioner for
New York, had published his celebrated History of the Five Nations of
Indians in 1727, but it dealt mostly with the Iroquois wars with the
French, and although it presented some treaty proceedings, it did not
provide a cultural analysis of Iroquois polity. Franklin met Colden in
New York in 1742 and included him as one of the early members of
the Philosophical Society. No doubt Franklin learned more about the
League of the Iroquois from Colden. An even earlier, and more sophisticated, account of Iroquois kinship and political institutions had been
published in Paris in 1709, written by Father Joseph-Francois Lafitau,
a Jesuit missionary among the Mohawk. It was probably not accessible
in Philadelphia in the middle of the 18th century and was not translated into English until William Fenton and Elizabeth Moore’s edition
appeared in 1974–7. Thomas Jefferson picked up a copy during his
tour as minister to France in the 1780’s following in the footsteps of
Franklin. But Jefferson was unable to appreciate the sophisticated and
intimate ethnography of kinship and council affairs, being distracted
by Lafitau’s comparison of the American Indian egalitarian cultures
with the democracy of ancient Greece. In replying to a letter from John
Adams asking for a general book on the Indians, Jefferson dismissed
Lafitau’s work in disparaging terms as being filled with “falsehoods”
and “absurdities.” Jefferson’s own Notes on the State of Virginia (Paris
1785) had much good to say about the Indians’ personal virtues but
did not discuss the organization of the Confederacy. Franklin himself,
while he was in France in the 1780’s, wrote a sketch of Indian manners
and customs titled “Remarks Concerning the Savages of North
America,” published in French (and English) for the salons of Paris. It
depended in part on his treaty experiences and on conversations with
Conrad Weiser.
These Indian treaties were public events usually held in White
trading posts, forts, towns, and cities; they lasted for days, sometimes
weeks, and were attended by hundreds of people, both White and
Indian. (For instance, more than 500 Indians attended the treaty at
Easton in 1758, and more than 2,000 attended at Fort Niagara in 1764).
Indian visitors—men, women, and children—were housed in special
dormitories. The delegations were led in person by the highest officials—
on the White side by representatives of the Crown, the governors, and
superintendents of Indian affairs of the relevant colonies (later the territories of the United States); and on the Indian side by sachem chiefs
from the Grand Council of the Six Nations and from chiefs’ councils of
other nations and tribal factions. The treaty commonly began with a
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formal evening, European-style, dinner, and the next day, a welcoming
address was given by the host (if White, the Governor, if Indian, the
Firekeeper). Both sides then performed a special ceremony of condolence for their counterparts, taken from the Six Nations Condolence
Ceremony for deceased chiefs. The bloody seats of the bereaved would
be wiped clean, and the Three Bare Words of the Requickening Address
were uttered (Eyes, Ears, and Throat), drying the mourners’ eyes of
tears, opening the ears, and clearing the throat, so that they could see
daylight again, hear speech, deliver words, and attend to business. The
graves of the dead were symbolically covered with fur blankets or trade
goods. There followed, day after day, alternating speeches by both sides,
translated by interpreters, formally addressing the issues that brought
them together. The interpreters probably did not provide simultaneous
translation but rather verbal summaries of the speeches; such summaries would be written down in English later.
Under the guidance of the interpreters, White spokesmen, like their
Indian counterparts, repeatedly alluded to the enduring friendship of
their nations, using the Iroquois metaphors of the Fire, the Road, and
the Great Chain of Friendship. These metaphors were a formal terminology that denoted abstract concepts. The Fire was the permanent
council fire, lit for the occasion by the party issuing the invitation, on
either side of which the parties sat, peaceably reasoning with one
another. The Road was the path of trade and communication between
the two peoples, often beset by all sorts of impediments: rocks and
fallen trees, noisy birds in the bushes spreading vile rumors, the bodies
of innocent travelers killed by bad men. The Great Chain of Friendship
tied together the Six Nations and the English colonies (acting always in
the name of the British Crown) in trade and in defense against aggression by the French and their Indian allies, a chain, however, that if
neglected was subject to rust, calling for efforts to polish and brighten
the Chain in treaties that renewed old agreements and joined old
friends together with new partners in a changing world. When a White
speaker had concluded his message, the Indians often requested
permission to delay their response until the following day so their
councils of chiefs and clan mothers could discuss the White man’s
words and formulate their own, collective answer. Significant points
were emphasized by the delivery of wampum by both sides: sometimes
single strings of tubular shell beads were presented, or, accompanying
major pronouncements, large belts woven of wampum strings, several
feet long, bearing figurative designs of humans and animals or abstract
metaphors such as the Two Row wampum belt. Dozens of these belts
and strings could be presented by the speakers in any one treaty. These
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exchanges of wampum served as evidence of the sincerity of the speaker,
and the importance of the subject (such as agreement to a military alliance or a cession of land), and as a physical record of the transaction,
comparable to the White man’s written documents. The Indian nations
preserved these strings and belts of wampum in a kind of official
archive, entrusted to a reliable person, and spokesmen were expected
to visit these collections regularly to refresh their memories of international events and commitments. Rum was not allowed during these
days of formal meeting. The treaty would end with a ceremonial dinner,
the presentation of trade goods, and, often, whiskey, as gifts or as
payment for land ceded by the treaty.
The Franklin text of an Indian treaty essentially contained three
elements: identification of participants; a narrative of events; and
minutes of the exchange of speeches, wampum, and other Native
memorials, and trade goods. The Native speeches were rendered into
English, of course, from an edited fair copy of notes and recollections
made by secretaries on the scene who listened to the translations and
explanations of meaning provided by the “interpreters,” both White and
Indian. Manuscript copies of some of these notes survive. The language
of these speeches was brought to its often elegant final form in many
instances by the Penns’ agents Richard Peters and James Logan, who
attended the treaties. Although errors and intentional omissions do blur
the record, these minutes are supplemented and at times corrected in
contemporaneous journals and correspondence of participants.
A central role in these proceedings was played by the person, or
persons, identified in the minutes as “Interpreter.”4 Interpreters were
men, occasionally women, who had learned the language and customs
of the other side by living with members of the alien community as
traders, often as a member of a family, over a period of years. Such
individuals might have been sent as children to live in the other community for the purpose of preparing them to serve as interpreters later on,
as was the case with the famous Pennsylvania interpreter, Franklin’s
friend, Conrad Weiser. Weiser’s parents were German immigrants who
settled in New York before moving to the Pennsylvania-Dutch region
and who boarded Conrad as a child with a Mohawk foster family so
he could learn the Mohawk language. In addition to advising their
principals on the protocol of treaties and translating their speeches,
interpreters were needed to obviate, as best they could, various impediments to understanding. Internal politics and personal conflicts lurked
behind the scene, such that interpreters were needed to verify the legitimacy of representatives and ensure that invitations were issued to all
the nations and colonies with an interest in treaty issue. What the
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interpreters could not do was prevent the following three fatal flaws,
flaws that brought about the end of the treaty system in 1871: (1) White
manipulation of frontier conflicts to coerce Indians to sell land in order
to have peace; (2) the intrusion of fraud, misrepresentation, and incompetence during treaty proceedings; and (3) the failure of both sides to
fulfill commitments after the treaty because of an inability to control
their own people.
Underlying these difficulties was a fundamental difference between
the Indian and European side, a difference of civilizations that was a
potential source of misunderstanding in all treaty negotiations. This
was the cultural divide between an Indigenous egalitarian society, in
which mutual rights and duties were based on kinship, and a
hierarchical society, in which mutual rights and duties were based on
authority. There was a fundamental difference of civilizations. The
difference lay in basic assumptions about society and the moral
values—the ethos—that enabled it to function. Whites brought up in
the European tradition saw human institutions as being naturally
ordered in what has come to be called a “table of organization.” The
Indians thought of society in terms of kinship.
The White schema is familiar as a chart depicting the administrative
structure of all sorts of enduring enterprises, including centralized
governments, standing armies, economic companies, schools, and
religious denominations. At the top of the chart is a supreme authority
(whether an individual or a group), and lines of command and control,
duty and obedience, specialization and rank descend downward in the
form of a pyramid, to a base-level of common citizen, enlisted man,
unskilled laborer, parishioner, freshman, etc. Franklin himself had a
penchant for designing the administrative structures of various institutions that served the public welfare. Examples include the system of fire
companies in Philadelphia; the Pennsylvania Hospital; the Philadelphia
College (later the University of Pennsylvania); a Philadelphia militia, the
postal service of the northern colonies; and, to be discussed later, his
1754 “Albany Plan of Union” of all the colonies, which anticipated the
1787 Constitution of the United States. Although the table of organization of even the smallest of these institutions required that somebody be
in charge, participation was voluntary. In such a rank and file world,
individual identity is one’s place in this hierarchy, signaled by a title indicating rank (such as “President,” “General,” “Sergeant,” “Professor”)
before one’s name and/or a suffix of initials indicating education and
honors (“R.N.,” “Ph.D.,” “S.J.”). In the Franklin treaties, the official
White delegates are listed with titles and suffixes, such as “The Honorable
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Proprietor Thomas Penn,” “Lieutenant-Governor George Thomas,”
“Benjamin Franklin, Esq.,” “Conrad Weiser, Interpreter.”
From this vantage point, Native American political structure
appeared to be extremely disjointed, as a result of the Indigenous ethos
of freedom of individuals to choose their own course of conduct.
Franklin’s friend Lewis Evans put the White view succinctly—there are
no Indian Kings, no “monarchical Government:”
They are all Republicks in The strictest Sense; every Nation has a
general Council, whither deputies are sent from every Village; & by
a majority of Votes every Thing is determined there. What is most
singular in American Government is no such thing as coercive
power in any Nation: nor does the Government ever interfere
between party & party: but let every one be judge & Executioner
in his own Case. Tho the National Councils have Power of War &
peace they can neither raise men nor appoint Officers: but leave it
to such as of their own Accord united & chuse their own war
Captain, nor has this Captain any Power to compel his Men, or to
punish them for neglect of duty & yet no Officer on earth is more
strictly obey’d, so strongly are they influenced by The principle of
doing their Duty uncompelled.

It is impossible not to digress from the subject of treaties and
consider the dichotomy of triangle and circle more generally. I am
reminded that the pyramid is a 3-dimensional triangle that as a symbol
of national unity and progress has been depicted since 1782 on the
Great Seal of the United States: an unfinished pyramid of 13 steps,
surmounted by the all-seeing Eye of Providence in a triangle at the top,
with Latin inscriptions hailing the new order of the ages and invoking
the blessing of the Almighty on the American enterprise. Its image
appears today on the one-dollar bill. Franklin was chair of the first
committee to design the Great Seal. He introduced the concept of the
omniscient Eye, conveying, perhaps, Franklin’s view of scientific
knowledge as a guide in human affairs superior to government. But the
final design was prepared by William Barton and Charles Thomson
(both members of the American Philosophical Society).
In treaty minutes, however, Indians are identified by name and only
occasionally by a title, conferred by the White scribes, such as “Chief,”
“Speaker,” or “Interpreter,” denoting their role in the conference as
seen by the Whites, but not necessarily corresponding to any permanent title in the Native community back home. A Western style of hierarchical relationships was sparingly employed in northeastern Indian
cultures and usually was temporary, as in the command-and-control
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structure of temporary war parties and the conduct of discussion and
communication centered in “councils.” Group decisions, as in meetings
of a Chiefs’ Council, required consensus and were rarely treated as
binding on the women and warriors; they were regarded as recommendations rather than as rule of law. For these Indians of the Northeast,
each nation was and still is a kinship system, in which everyone is
related to everyone else by links of consanguinity and affinity, and a
table of organization for any institution or enterprise can be mapped
onto the genealogical chart of this system. The genealogical chart is
conceptualized not as a triangle, or a pyramid, but as a circle. As a
tribal genealogist explained it to me rather forcefully, the genealogical
chart of a clan is not a triangle as I visualized it, which implies hierarchy, but a circle, which implies equality. The clan is an endless cycle
of beings, each bearing a name belonging to the clan that is formally
conferred on the young, coming from beneath the ground, living, and
returning to earth, releasing the name. In effect, a circular, egalitarian
kinship system, in which the rule is voluntary reciprocity rather than
duty, is the table of organization.
Each of the Six Nations was composed of several matrilineal clans,
each of which was named for an important species, such as Turtle, Bear,
or Snipe. (White observers often referred to these clans by the word
“tribe.”) With respect to clan, and therefore to membership in the
nation, the rule was, “You are what your mother is.” The clans were
exogamous, so that husbands and wives had to be of different clans.
Each clan had a “clan-mother,” who nominated one or two male
members of the clan to represent the clan for life in a council (the
“chiefs’ council”). The council could deputize its own members, or
other individuals of merit, to carry out missions, such as serving as
“speaker” to represent the council’s views faithfully and elegantly in
“treaties” with other nations. There was no king or supreme ruler.
The Six Nations conceived of the relations between nations in the
same terms as relations between individuals within the nation, referring to each other by the same kinship terminology. Within the Six
Nations, there were two moieties: the Elder Brothers (Mohawk, Onondaga, and Seneca) and the Younger Brothers (Oneida, Cayuga, and
Tuscarora) In the case of a chief’s death, the grieving moiety would be
condoled by the other, who would raise up a new chief as part of the
Condolence Ceremony, the major ritual of the Confederacy. Nations
affiliated with the Confederacy addressed each other, and the Six
Nations, by kinship terms, and the Six Nations referred to tributary
members of the Confederacy as “Cousins,” and referred to (and
addressed) the representatives of the European monarchies (French and
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British) as “Father.” These terms all recognize some sort of positive
relationship, but the finer meanings remain obscure. Father was a
somewhat distant relationship because one’s biological father necessarily (from the rule of clan exogamy) belonged to a different clan;
one’s mother’s brother, Uncle, was more like a father in the European
sense. Brothers were older and younger, the younger properly deferring
to the elder. And English “cousins” were, in Iroquois usage, divided
into “Brothers” and “Sisters” (parallel cousins, children of one’s
mother’s sister, who was “Mother,” and father’s brother, who was
“Father”) and into “Cousins” (cross-cousins, children of one’s mother’s
brother and father’s sister) of different clans.
For patrilineally trained White negotiators, further complicating
the concept of “chief” was the Iroquois rule of matrilineal succession. A
man’s son could not succeed his father as chief in his father’s clan
because he belonged to a different clan from his father; that father’s
successor as chief could be his sister’s son, i.e. his maternal nephew, or
another member of his own clan. But the Algonkian allies of the Six
Nations in the Ohio Valley were patrilineal in reckoning descent,
including clan membership; their kinship system was the opposite of
the matrilineal Iroquois. At Carlisle, for instance, the wife of the late
Piankeshaw chief had to make a special appeal, through an Iroquois
speaker, for the White people and the Six Nations to recognize her
husband’s son as the future chief. Failure to pay attention to cultural
differences in rule of consanguinity and affinity could lead to mistakes
in recognizing the presence or lack of valid credentials of those claiming
authority to represent their nations.
An even more troubling semantic problem was attached to the
word “Chief.” White officials usually did not grasp the status of all the
Indian participants in the treaty proceedings. Back home in Iroquoia,
the equivalent of the English term “chief” was royaner. The Grand
Council was composed of fifty royaner, each of whom was the representative of a particular clan. Once the antlers of office had been placed
on the Chief’s head, he inherited a name that had been held by all
previous representatives and would be held by his successors and thus
was, in effect, a title for that position. The royaner were nominated by
the clan mothers of their respective clans. These were the true chiefs.
They could, and did, however, put forward men of merit as speakers,
head warriors, and men to do business, who might play an important
role at treaties but were not authorized to make binding commitments,
such as military alliances and cessions of land. The chiefs themselves,
indeed, could not make such commitments individually, only when a
group was authorized by a consensus of the council. Failure of White
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officials to realize these constraints upon the delegates to a treaty could
lead to cessions of land by unauthorized “chiefs” and to future land
claims by embittered Indian descendants, claims that continue to this
day. White negotiators wanted to find the “King,” but in an egalitarian
society, there is no “King” and the Speaker at a treaty could not commit
all of the members of his own nation or the confederacy, let alone the
sprawling alliance of the Ohio tribes, to the policy favored by the
Grand Council at Onondaga. Council decisions within nations, and in
the Grand Council, were reached by consensus, not a majority vote.
The Council might reach a consensus to recommend peace with the
Cherokees but a few bereaved family members might nevertheless
initiate a “mourning war” to avenge a fellow clansman. White civilizations considered “factions,” whose members refused to obey a law or
edict as binding, to be treasonous; Indians recognized that regional
interests might impel a sub-group to travel a different path and exercised forbearance.
The Doctrine of Discovery
Franklin’s publication of the Indian treaties was in itself an important
event in development of relations between the Indian nations and the
British colonies. In addition to giving information about Native American
customs and values, these treaty minutes provided a model for the future
conduct of negotiations, and particularly negotiations over the cession of
land. They put forward the Pennsylvania system as the basis of the future
policy for acquiring Indian land by the United States.
The Pennsylvania system recognized that the Crown had acquired an
absolute sovereignty over its colonial territory by right of the Doctrine of
Discovery. This sovereignty included not only political sovereignty but
also ownership of the land, not only including eminent domain and
mineral rights, but also the right of soil. When King James gave the province of Pennsylvania to William Penn, the charter made no mention of
Indian inhabitants or their rights. Penn chose to recognize a right of soil
held by the Indians of Pennsylvania, an aboriginal title that could be
conveyed not by war but only by purchase or other voluntary conveyance by the Indian owners. But what made the case of Pennsylvania
unique was that the Penns, as Proprietors, chose not to delegate or sell
the right to purchase to other White, British individuals or companies,
but to become themselves the single purchaser of Indian lands. Prospective settlers then had to buy or lease land directly from the Penns.
Furthermore, the Penns considered that the Indians had owned, and the
Proprietors had bought, only surface rights. Mineral rights remained as
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part of the proprietary estate and thus belonged to the State of Pennsylvania, an issue of great importance in the next century after coal, iron,
and oil became central to the state’s industrial economy.
The Pennsylvania model for acquiring Indian land stood in sharp
contrast with the practice of other British colonies. To the north, in
New York and Massachusetts, aboriginal title was recognized, but the
right to purchase was given, or sold, to individuals and companies,who
received a patent and then proceeded to buy a specified tract from
Indian owners, sometimes in formal treaty, sometimes in private agreements. To the south, at first in Virginia, and later in other colonies, the
initial assumption was that the Indians had no right of soil, purchase
was not necessary, and land could be occupied by force or informal
agreement. Further complicating inter-colonial differences was an overlapping of claims, the result of boundaries being set by different
“discoverers” on behalf of the same or different kings. Virginia, for
instance, laid claim to a vast swath of territory north of the Ohio River
and west to the “South Sea” (Pacific Ocean). Pennsylvania’s grant had a
specific western limit, but Connecticut claimed some of Pennsylvania’s
land in the Susquehanna Valley. New York and Massachusetts both
claimed the same land from the Hudson River to Lake Erie.
Competing with Britain in the rush to appropriate the Indian land
of North America were France and Spain, who like Britain founded
their territorial claims on the Doctrine of Discovery. In the years 1452,
1454, and 1493, Popes Nicholas V and Alexander VI issued papal bulls
that together form the original text of what has been called “the
Doctrine of Discovery.” The age of expansion and exploration by the
Christian nations of Europe was just beginning. Spain and Portugal
were driving the Muslims (“Saracens”) out of the Iberian peninsula;
trade with infidel peoples in Africa and Asia was on the increase, in
part because Genoese innovations in ship-building now made more
extended ocean voyages possible. It was time to launch a new crusade,
this one to recover the lands lost to the Moslems and go on to conquer
the whole world for Christ.
The first bull, Dum Diversas, was addressed to King Alfonso of
Portugal:
We grant to you full and free power, through the Apostolic
authority of this edict, to invade, conquer, fight, subjugate the
Saracens and pagans and other infidels and other enemies of Christ
and wherever established their Kingdoms, Duchies, Royal Palaces,
Principalities and other dominions . . . and any other possessions . . .
and to lead their persons in perpetual servitude and to apply and
appropriate realms, duchies, royal palaces, principalities, and other
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dominions, possessions, or goods of this kind to you and your
successors the kings of Portugal.

In the bull Romanus Pontifex 2 years later, the Pope extended to
other “Catholic kings and princes” of Europe the same authority to
invade and conquer non-Christian lands, reduce their inhabitants to
slavery, and appropriate all their possessions to their own use. Restrictions on trade were imposed to prevent the pagan nations from
acquiring European technology. And the King of Portugal was given
exclusive rights to those lands that he had already acquired.
On the return of Columbus from the New World, the next Pope,
Alexander VI, issued a bull, Inter Caetera, recognizing the rights of
Ferdinand and Isabella to the lands that Columbus had discovered and
granting Spain an exclusive charter to trade with or invade all lands
100 leagues west of the Azores, the line to run from the Arctic to the
Antarctic pole. (The Vatican knew the 1,000-year-old “Geography” of
the Greek cartographer Claudius Ptolemy, who described the world as
a sphere, measured by lines of latitude and longitude.) But Spain could
not claim lands already appropriated by another Christian nation, thus
establishing in international law (as construed by Christian Europeans)
the same rights of exclusive sovereignty in the New World as applied to
the same nations in Europe.
In effect, this Doctrine of Discovery meant that the captain of a
ship could stab his sword into the sand of an unknown shore and
declare in the name of God that a territory from sea to sea, any number
of leagues north and south, now belonged to his king (but only so far
as the land had not already been “discovered” by another captain
working for another king). The declaration might have been merely a
vacuous announcement, in a meaningless language, by beings from
UFOs, to the native inhabitants of the territory, if it had not been
followed by the landing of boatloads of Europeans carrying arms,
establishing trading posts and forts, building villages and planting
farms, and eventually driving the Indigenous people off their lands or
forcing them to surrender to colonial authorities. The Doctrine of
Discovery became the law of the land.
It is easy to read the Doctrine of Discovery as simply a license to
greedy European monarchs to conquer and exploit the Indigenous
peoples of the world. That it was. But it is important, in an inquiry into
the ethnography of war, to understand how the popes, and the Catholic
kings, perceived the circumstances of their time. Two major political
processes were under way in the Mediterranean world of the 15th
century: the Portuguese and Spanish inquisitions; and the rise of the
Ottoman Empire.
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The Inquisition was part of the thrust to drive the Moors (Muslims)
out of the Iberian peninsula and cleanse the region of Jews and other
heretics. Many Jews and Moors had converted to Christianity, some of
them occupying high places in church, the royal bureaucracy, and the
banking industry, but their sincerity was often questioned. The Inquisition was managed by the kings, and apostasy was a political crime.
While these infidels were being expelled or burned at the stake, another,
even more serious, threat to Christendom was growing along the
eastern Mediterranean. The Ottoman Empire was expanding by military and diplomatic means out of Turkey into the Middle East, Egypt,
and the Balkans. Constantinople, the center of the Eastern Orthodox
branch of Christianity, fell to the Turks in 1453. Vienna itself was
besieged in 1529 and 1532. And the Ottomans controlled the lucrative
land trade routes to Asia.
From the standpoint of Pope Nicholas V, the fate of Christendom
itself was threatened by the presence of Jews and Moors in Spain and
Portugal; the Ottoman followers of Mohammed were enemies at the
gates of European nations. Nicholas sought to revive the intellectual
stature of Europe by supporting the new Renaissance humanism; he
founded the Vatican Library. But he also sought to counter the economic,
military, and religious power of the Islamic world by calling for a new
Crusade against the Turks. And his encouragement of Portuguese and
Spanish conquests of infidel nations in Africa and India would bring the
whole apparatus of the Church of Christ into the new lands.
But it is also clear that Nicholas envisaged that bypassing the old
land routes to Asia would lead to the development of a world system of
trade and commerce dominated by European powers. European nations
would be able to use their own technological superiority to control
world trade by control of the seas, breaking out beyond the
Mediterranean into the Atlantic and Indian oceans. European navigators
knew that the world was round and were aware of the measurable
spaces of latitude and longitude. European ship builders employed new,
superior methods of wooden sheathing; they were able to make long
voyages out of sight of land. European armies had horses, cannons,
wheeled carts, and iron and steel armor and swords, enabling a small
force to overwhelm lightly armed resistance. The Pope was aware of the
need to maintain technological superiority and the importance of withholding information and materials from the infidels. The bull of 1454
prohibited the sale of “iron instruments, wood to be used for construction, cordage, ships, or any kinds of armor” or the teaching of “the art
of navigation, whereby they [those infidels] would become more
powerful . . .” The importance of this embargo on technological transfer
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was so important that the Pope declared that violators would suffer, in
addition to legal penalties, “the sentence of excommunication,” to be
levied upon not only guilty individuals but whole communities.
Thus, in the following centuries, European trade and arms were able
to overwhelm the entire regions of Africa, North and South America,
and Australia, as well as India and much of southeast Asia, Indonesia,
and Oceania. In the course of this economic and military conquest, and
the accompanying ravages of disease and starvation, they were able to
colonize not only hunters, gatherers, and village farmers, but also the
sophisticated civilizations of Mexico, Central America, the Andes, North
Africa, and India. The Doctrine of Discovery had been advanced to
justify the military and economic colonization of most of the planet by
European powers, including North America, South America, Africa,
Australia, Indonesia, and Oceania, as well as most of Asia except China
and Japan. The contemporary world system of core and peripheral
nations was founded upon the Doctrine of Discovery.
Needless to say, the Indigenous peoples of the world have questioned the legitimacy of the Doctrine of Discovery. In the past two
centuries, many of the colonies have won at least nominal independence. A few years ago, the Indigenous movement, led in part by the
Six Nations, achieved the passage, by the United Nations General
Assembly, of a Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The
late John Mohawk, a Seneca friend of mine, drafted the earliest version.
I regret to say that the United States was one of only four countries to
decline at first to vote for the Declaration.
In Franklin’s time, the Doctrine of Discovery was interpreted differently by France and Spain from English practice. Neither nation recognized Indian nations as having aboriginal title to their lands. From the
outset, the Catholic monarchs assumed absolute unlimited title,
including the underlying right of eminent domain, mineral rights below
ground, and ownership of the soil in fee simple. In the case of Spain,
the monarchs also assumed an obligation to save native souls by
conversion to Catholicism and a duty to protect their Indian subjects
from injury by Whites and other Indians by assigning them to what in
effect were reservations (i.e., the encomienda system), governed by
some combination of native and European administrators. France also
assumed absolute title to Indian land, the recompense being conversion
to Christian faith by the devoted Jesuit and other missionary orders.
France, however, in contrast to French and English segregationist
policies, welcomed Christian Indians as equal subjects of the Crown
and encouraged biracial communities, The overlapping land claims of
the European powers, and the different styles of racial interaction and
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loyalty, set the stage for the diplomatic, trade, and military maneuverings
that led to the French and Indian War.
The Albany Plan of Union
Anticipating the outbreak of open war (the “French and Indian War”),
the colonies in 1754 joined in a conference at Albany to concert plans
for the common defense against attack by Indian allies of the French.
Franklin was becoming known as the Pennsylvania Assembly’s leading
authority on Indian affairs and he was one of the delegates. He was
chosen to prepare a draft of a proposal for a confederation of the
colonies, the famous “Albany Plan of Union.” Franklin’s Plan recommended a centralized government for the 13 colonies, with its own
President and Grand Council (i.e., legislature), subject only to the
authority of the Crown. He articulated these principles in some detail,
utilizing his penchant for drawing up tables of organization. This
central government should, using established treaty protocol, “make all
purchases from the Indians for the crown of all lands not within the
bounds of particular colonies,” obviating the chaos of different procedures among the colonies, and should make all laws regulating Indian
trade, including the sale of rum, which Franklin deplored, regarding it
as a means of genocide. It provided that all of the English colonies
recognize the Indian nations’ sovereignty and aboriginal title to their
land, which could only be acquired by fair, open treaty according to the
Pennsylvania protocol. Further, any purchases beyond the charter limits
of the original colonies would be made by a single purchaser, the Union
itself, on behalf of the Crown itself. After the Revolution, the Crown’s
rights were transferred to the United States itself, which became the
single purchaser on its own behalf. Although the Albany Plan of Union
was not accepted by the 13 colonies or the Crown, the single purchaser
principle became the governing concept later in provisions under the
British Proclamation Line of 1763, the American Northwest Ordinance
and the Articles of Confederation of 1784, and the Constitution after
1787. His statement of a general policy for the acquiring of Indian
lands in formal treaties by a single purchaser and for the regulation of
the fur trade so as to cut off the destructive sale of rum was Franklin’s
most important contribution to Indian affairs.5
These views were based in part on his admiration for the political
wisdom of the Six Nations. He had in earlier years come to admire the
Iroquois ability to form a union of disparate political entities. Perhaps
he took to heart the admonition of the Onondaga speaker Canasetego,
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who at Lancaster in 1744 (during a treaty printed by Franklin)
counseled the colonies to form a union:
We have one Thing further to say, and that is, We heartily recommend
Union and a good Agreement between you our Brethren. Never
disagree, but preserve a strict Friendship for one another, and thereby
you, as well as we, will become the stronger. Our wise Forefathers
established Union and Amity between the Five Nations; this has
made us formidable; this has given us great Weight and Authority
with our neighbouring Nations. We are a powerful Confederacy;
and, by your observing the same Methods our wise Forefathers have
taken, you will acquire fresh Strength and Power; therefore whatever
befalls you, never fall out with one another.

In a letter to a friend in 1751, Franklin later observed, “It would be a
very strange thing if six nations of ignorant savages could be capable of
forming such a union . . . and yet that a like union should be impracticable
for ten or a dozen English colonies, to whom it is more necessary.”
The requirement that a single purchaser make all purchases of land
from any Indian nation in future territories outside the existing colonies
was the most significant element of his Indian policy, and although not
enacted into law at that time, it became the governing concept later in
provisions under the Northwest Territory Ordinance and the application
of the Constitution. The need for a single purchaser principle came from
the chaotic mixture of existing practice. In New York, for example, individual persons or company could approach Indians who seemed to
occupy a desirable tract and buy the land from them, then carry the deed
of sale to the governor, who issued a “patent” (in effect, a title). The
possibility of malpractice in such an arrangement was obvious, not only
fraud by White purchasers but irresponsibility by Indian sellers. Different
White purchasers could easily obtain “title” to the same land by buying
from different Indians. The Indians could be persuaded to sign while in a
drunken stupor. In most such transactions, there was no formal treaty
with legitimate members of the Council of the Indian nation. In Pennsylvania, however, all purchases were made by the proprietors and private
individuals, who later sold them to companies. But the proprietary agents
preferred to buy from the Six Nations, attributing Indian title to the most
powerful entity, but perhaps failing to satisfy the interests of the occupants of the soil, as in the Walking Purchase. Furthermore, colonial charters were sometimes loosely phrased, allowing for overlap in claims of
the right to acquire land from the Indians. Thus, Connecticut claimed
land in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts claimed land in New York, and
Virginia claimed everything from the Appalachian Mountains to the
Pacific Ocean.
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During the Indian treaty proceedings at Albany, Mohawk speakers
complained about this unsatisfactory state of affairs. One bone of
contention was the still-controversial “Kayaderossera Patent,” granted
by Queen Anne in 1701 to a group of 10 speculators of 800,000 acres
along the Hudson River in what is now Saratoga and adjoining
counties. It was not surveyed, however, for 70 years, as a result of
objections by the Mohawk, who claimed that the three Mohawks who
“sold” the land were not authorized to do so. Although they were
members of the three Mohawk clans (Turtle, Bear, and Wolf), each clan
comprised several lineages, each of which was represented on the
Mohawk Council by three sachems, and there were no records of the
Council as a whole being consulted. A settlement with the Mohawk
Nation was not concluded until 1761.
Franklin included under “Indian Trade” the need for a regulation
of the destructive commerce in whiskey, which “through the bad
conduct of traders who cheat the Indians after making them drunk”
cost the existing colonies “great expence . . . in blood and treasure.” In
this he reiterated the plea he and the other commissioners had made at
Carlisle the year before. In his Autobiography, written decades later, he
recollected the drunken orgy of the Indians, after the conclusion of that
treaty (whose proceedings had been “orderly”), as a scene from Hell:
They [the Indians] were near one hundred men, women, and
children, and were lodg’d in temporary cabins, built in the form of
a square, just without the town. In the evening, hearing a great
noise among them, the commissioners walk’d out to see what was
the matter, We found that they had made a great bonfire in the
middle of the square; they were all drunk, men and women
quarreling and fighting. Their dark-colour’d bodies, half naked,
seen only by the gloomy light of the bonfire, running and beating
one another with firebrands, accompanied by their horrid yellings,
form’d a scene the most resembling our ideas of hell that could
well be imagined . . .

He added, “If it be the design of Providence to extirpate these
savages in order to make room for cultivators of the soil, it seems not
improbable that rum may be the appointed means.” Franklin was not a
tee-totaling temperance man; he provided his troops with rum at
Gnadenhuetten, but he believed in moderation in the use of alcohol for
Whites as well as Indians. His condemnation of the whiskey trade in
the Albany Plan was emphatic: “. . . they are supplyed with Rum by the
traders in vast and almost incredible quantities… they often wound
and murder one another in their Liquor, and to avoid Revenge flee to
the French . . .”
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The principles of Franklin’s Indian policy grew out of a European
Enlightenment view of world history. The basic elements of this
perspective, as interpreted by British officials in Franklin’s time, were:
1. Natural law justifies, and the idea of progress predicts, the replacement of “savage” hunters and gatherers and village gardeners, who
subsist on land that yields them a slender harvest, by agriculturists
who farm intensively by advanced methods and thereby can
support larger numbers of “civilized” people.
2. It is preferable, because it is more just and more economical, for
civilized countries to acquire Indigenous land by peaceful means
rather than by war.
3. Indigenous land is owned collectively by its aboriginal occupants,
who are recognized as self-governing sovereign nations, that may
sell land voluntarily.
4. Indigenous land may be sold only to a single purchaser (in the case
of the English colonies, the Crown, and later the government of the
United States).
5. The concept of “single purchaser” is derived from the 15th century
papal Doctrine of Discovery, which gave exclusive rights of access
to the first Christian nation to “discover” a new land.
6. Purchase must be done in formal treaties between sovereign
nations, conducted without coercion or fraud, according to traditional protocol, combining both Indian and White diplomatic
etiquette, as exemplified by the British-Six Nations treaties.6

The importance of Franklin’s Indian land cessions policy, as
expressed in his Albany Plan, cannot be over-estimated, and the respect
in which he was held as an authority on Indian affairs was widely
recognized. At the outset of the Revolution, Franklin was a member of
the First Continental Congress. In July 1775, the Congress established
a committee to manage Indian affairs, consisting of three departments:
one for the Six Nations, one for the Indians of the Ohio country, and
one for the southern tribes. Benjamin Franklin and the jurist James
Wilson represented Pennsylvania in Congress, Patrick Henry represented Virginia in the middle department, and Franklin served as the
chairman of the whole Committee, earning him recognition, in the 21st
century by the Bureau of Indian Affairs as their first commissioner.
Under Franklin’s leadership, the new Congress sought to win the Indian
nations to their side, holding the Treaty of Fort Pitt to urge western
allies of the Six Nations to remain neutral. At Albany, the Commissioners in fulsome rhetoric called for peace and friendship between the
Six Nations and the colonists, employing the Iroquois metaphor of the
Confederacy’s universal tree of peace:
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Brothers! We live upon the same ground with you. The same island
is our common birth-pace. We desire to sit down under the same
tree of peace with you: let us water its roots and cherish its growth
until the large leaves and flourishing branches shall extend to the
setting sun and reach the skies.

Franklin did not remain long as Indian Committee chairman,
however, sailing off to become minister to France a year later in
October 1776. But in a partial adoption of Franklin’s “policies, the
single purchaser principle had already become the governing concept in
the provisions of the British Indian policy.
In a partial adoption of Franklin’s “single-purchaser” protocol, the
Crown declared in 1763 the famous Proclamation Line. This
Proclamation of 1763 prohibited the purchase of Indian lands west of
the Appalachian Mountains and recognized the Indian right of soil. West
of that line, title to Indian lands acquired by seizure, private purchase, or
private purchase under provincial license (i.e., “patent”), would no
longer be recognized as legal. Before any cession of land could be accomplished, a royal patent would have to be issued by the Crown or its
agents (in the north, Sir William Johnson) and the purchase confirmed in
a fair and open treaty. Despite much objection by colonists, the Proclamation and its revision at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768), provided
an opportunity for Benjamin Franklin and other notable colonial
entrepreneurs (such as Washington and Patrick Henry) to secure royal
patents and conduct purchases without the encumbrance of overlapping
land claims from provinces such as Virginia and Pennsylvania.
From 1767 until 1775, Franklin associated himself with several such
land speculations, seeking patent rights directly from the Crown to
purchase (or validate previous purchases of) Indian land in the Ohio
country. Franklin was for a time in England in the 1770s a prominent
shareholder, among other powerful men, in an enterprise called the
Grand Ohio Company that claimed to have assembled a vast estate in
present Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky, originally purchased by the
Illinois and Wabash land companies from various Indian tribes,
amounting to nearly 90,000 square miles, approximately the size of
Great Britain. The plan was to form a new Crown colony, to be named
Vandalia, in honor of Caroline, queen-consort of George III, who was
descended from the Germanic tribe that had conquered Rome. Although
Franklin lobbied successfully before the Privy Council for its approval of
a royal patent to recognize the validity of the purchase, the project lapsed
during the Revolution. But it did not die. Citing forged documents, heirs
of the old Wabash Company were able after 60 years to bring a claim of
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ownership before the United States Supreme Court in the celebrated case
of Johnson v. M’Intosh. In denying the Wabash claim, Chief Justice
Marshall, as was noted, affirmed the single-purchaser principle and cited
the Doctrine of Discovery as its source.7
Indian Wars
After the failure of the Albany Plan, there followed a series of Indian
wars. White negotiators were unable to accept native conceptions of
nationhood and held to a persistent view of the Six Nations as an authoritarian state that could be persuaded to coerce its tributaries to comply
with British demands in matters of trade and alliance against the French.
One case of the failure to understand the limits of Iroquois “imperial”
power was the infamous Walking Purchase. Franklin’s enduring concern
for preserving friendship with Pennsylvania’s Indians may have been
awakened by that contentious issue, which ran throughout his series of
published treaties. A Pennsylvania company headed by James Logan, the
Penns’ agent in Indian affairs, planned to locate an iron furnace on land
occupied by some Delaware Indians, land allegedly purchased long
before in an obscure 17th century treaty, the original copy of which had
unfortunately been lost. A Delaware occupant protested, claiming that
no such sale had been made and that he had inherited the tract from his
father. The land was surveyed by White speed walkers covering more
ground in the specified “day and a half” than the Indians said had been
intended. A Six Nations speaker, solicited by the Penns, expounded the
Iroquois concept of land tenure as ownership by the nation as a whole
and asserted that the Six Nations had acquired an underlying ownership
to the land in question by conquest. Canasatego denounced their
“cousins” the Delaware, who had occupancy rights but should have
included the Six Nations when they ceded the tract, and who anyway did
not really have a central council fire of their own and were “women,”
cousins who could not sell land.8
The Walking Purchase issue and related Delaware grievances eventually embroiled Franklin in military combat. In 1751, he was elected
to a seat in the Pennsylvania Assembly. Here he identified himself with
the anti-proprietary party, which opposed the Penn family in England,
who refused to pay taxes on the vast proprietary estates. This “Quaker”
party blamed the alienation of the Delaware Indians on the fraudulent
Walking Purchase, which allegedly was contributing to the migration
of many Delaware to the upper Susquehanna valley at Wyoming, as
ordered by Canasetego, and to the defection of some to the French
interest in the looming war. Thomson, a signer of the Declaration of
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Independence, Secretary of the Continental Congress from 1774 to
1789, and a hot patriot, had been a close friend of Franklin’s in Indian
affairs. He and Franklin were leaders in the anti-proprietary party in
Pennsylvania during the era of the French and Indian War. Thomson in
particular had taken up the cause of the Delaware in blaming the
proprietary for the outbreak of violence on the frontier. He served as
secretary and advisor to the Delaware “chief” Teedyuscung at the treaty
at Easton in 1758 (printed and probably attended by Franklin). In
1759, he published a celebrated book, The Causes of the Alienation of
the Delaware and Shawanese Indians from the British Interest, which
blamed the proprietors and their Walking Purchase. Although historians, including myself, have discounted Thomson’s argument that the
Walking Purchase was the primary cause of the alienation, the event
serves to represent the pattern of Indian grievances over the loss of
their land to greedy speculators and hostile settlers.
After Braddock’s defeat in July 1755, the Pennsylvania frontier
came under attack. In November 1755, hostile warriors assaulted the
Moravian community of Gnadenhuetten, a cooperative venture of
White Moravian and Christian Delaware farm families, killing at least
10 Whites and putting the Indian converts to flight. This community
had been located at the northwest corner of the Walking Purchase, up
the Lehigh River from Bethlehem, where the main Moravian town in
the Purchase had been placed in 1743. In anticipation of such attacks,
Franklin had written an act, passed by the Assembly, for the creation of
a Pennsylvania militia regiment to defend the frontiers. He detailed the
organization of the unit and accepted a commission as Colonel in
command. With 560 volunteer soldiers, he marched north in January
1756 to Gnadenhuetten to begin the building of a line of forts. After
burying the dead settlers, his troops constructed the palisades and firing
platforms of four such forts.9
A frequent breach of treaty agreements was caused by the inability
of colonial and, later, the federal government to prevent outbreaks of
violence against Indians by frontier Whites. An egregious example that
also involved Franklin was the Conestoga massacre. A mob of “Paxton
boys” slaughtered several peaceful, Christian, Indian families living at
Lancaster near the Susquehanna River in accordance with
understandings with the Six Nations, their “uncle.” This event occurred
in December 1763, near the end of the Pontiac Rebellion. Then a mob
of Paxton boys and their supporters marched on Philadelphia to
confront the allegedly “pro-Indian” government of the province and
murder a community of Christian Indians from the Moravian settlements at Bethlehem seeking refuge in the city. They were only stopped
by British troops and local militiamen, including Franklin, again
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carrying a gun. He had already published a pamphlet condemning the
massacre, asking, “If an Indian injures me, does it follow that I may
revenge that injury on all Indians?” Ten years later, the famous Logan
“the Great Mingo,” a former neighbor of the Conestoga, took his own
revenge for that massacre and the murder of his kinfolk in Lord
Dunmore’s War, the first of a series of wars for control of Indian land
in the Ohio country, which did not end until after the War of 1812.
Jefferson immortalized the events leading to Lord Dunmore’s War in
his publication of “Logan’s Lament.”
During the wars for the Northwest Territory, the United States
sought to dissuade the Six Nations from supporting the Western
Confederacy. This diplomatic effort led to the landmark Treaty of
Canandaigua in 1794, negotiated by Timothy Pickering (who the
following year was elected to membership in the American Philosophical
Society). In this treaty, The United States recognized the Six Nations as
a sovereign political entity that held aboriginal title to its lands in New
York State. When and if the Six Nations freely chose to sell land, the
United States would be the sole and only purchaser. A perpetual friendship between the two nations was established. The Canandaigua Treaty
put into effect the principles that Benjamin Franklin had articulated at
Albany 40 years before.
Buying the Northwest Territory
It was not until 1795 that a comprehensive peace was accomplished at
the landmark Treaty of Greenville, which extended the provisions of
the Canandaigua agreement to the nations west of the Appalachians.
This treaty observed some of the orderly, mutually respectful protocol
of Franklin’s treaties, including an exchange of condolences for slain
warriors. A line of property was drawn between Lake Erie and the
Ohio River, west of which lay Indian land, encompassing the rest of the
Northwest Territory (today’s Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and
Wisconsin). The language of the treaty recognized Indian ownership of
land, declared the United States to be the exclusive purchaser when
Indians wished to sell, and committed the United States to be the
protector of the Indians, promising that the U.S. government would
hear Indian complaints and see that justice was done:
The Indian tribes who have a right to those lands, are quietly to
enjoy them, hunting, planting, and dwelling thereon so long as they
please, without any molestation from the United States; but when
those tribes, or any of them, shall be disposed to sell their lands, or
any part of them, they are to be sold only to the United States . . . .
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And the said Indian tribes again acknowledge themselves to be under
the protection of the United States and no other power
whatsoever.10

Attorneys bringing land claims cases before the Indian Claims
Commission in the 1950s relied on Greenville and the Trade and Intercourse Acts as the laws under which to sue the United States for failing
to protect the Indian nations, as their guardian, from injury in land
cession treaties.
The Greenville treaty, making the United States the legal guardian
of Indian interests, was the legal capstone of the post-Revolution Indian
policy, based on principles agreed on by President George Washington
and his Secretary of War, Henry Knox. These principles were articulated in two measures, the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 and the
system of federal trading posts, called “factories.” The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 (and re-enacted in subsequent years) explicitly
required that the purchase of Indian land be conducted “at some public
treaty, held under the authority of the United States,” and carried out in
a fair manner to ensure justice to the Indians. The factory system
would, hopefully, prevent private traders from flooding the Indian
country with alcohol. The factory system was opposed by traders and
terminated in 1822. But the Trade and Intercourse Acts remained in
place. Washington and Knox were implementing the same principles
that Franklin had asserted in his Albany Plan of Union of 1754. And,
needless to say, both Washington and Knox were members of the
American Philosophical Society.
For 50 years following Greenville, the United States pursued a
steady policy of acquiring Indian land in the Northwest Territory, the
South, and the Louisiana Purchase. The federally appointed Superintendents of Indian Affairs (who were often the Governors) of each of
the successive federal territories arranged the purchases. The first goal
was to usher the Indians to places west of the Mississippi, culminating
in the Removal Act of 1830. By the 1840s, about one third of the territory of the present United States had been acquired in a series of treaties. But in these treaties, there were two departures from pre-Revolution
colonial protocol. Land would be purchased from individual Indian
nations, not from confederacies. Thus at Fort Stanwix in 1784, peace
was “given” to, and land was ceded by, the individual nations, not the
Six Nations as a unit. After Greenville, treaties would not be held with
the Northwest Confederacy but with the individual nations. There
would no negotiations with the confederacy as the “single-seller.” And
again unlike the colonial practice, the “Indian reservations” west of the
Greenville line were not tracts chosen by the Indian owners and
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reserved from sale, as was and still is the case with Six Nations reserves
in New York, but rather parcels of public lands of the United States on
which Indians agreed, or were assigned, to live, in some cases far from
their original homelands.
Implementation and rationalization of this policy after Greenville
fell into the hands of seven men. They were Thomas Jefferson, Vice
President of the United States 1797–1801 and President 1801–9, and
longtime President of the American Philosophical Society; William
Henry Harrison (“Mr. Jefferson’s Hammer”), Governor of the Northwest Territory 1800–12 and later the Indiana territory, and President of
the United States in 1841; Meriwether Lewis and William Clark
(leaders of “The Corps of Discovery” of the Louisiana Purchase),
Governors and Superintendents of Indian Affairs, Louisiana Territory,
1806–38; Lewis Cass (“The Last Jeffersonian”), Secretary of War
1831–36, and ethnologist Henry Schoolcraft, both Governors and
Superintendents of Indian Affairs, Michigan Territory 1813–41; and
John Marshall, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court until his death in
1838, who affirmed the principle that the United States, not individual
colonies, had acquired underlying title to any and all of the territories
claimed by Great Britain south of Canada and thereby became the sole
purchaser of Indian land, thus enshrining the Doctrine of Discovery
into U.S. constitutional law. Four of these men joined Jefferson as
members of the American Philosophical Society (Meriwether Lewis,
Lewis Cass, Henry Schoolcraft, and John Marshall), and a fifth
(William Clark) was trained along with Lewis by members of the
American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia in preparation for their
exploration of the Louisiana Purchase. Clark’s journals of the expedition reside in the Society’s Library. Harrison’s father, from Virginia, was
a signer of the Declaration of Independence, and young Harrison,
before his military career and years as Governor of the Indiana Territory, had studied medicine in Philadelphia and lived with the family of
Robert Morris, another member of the Philosophical Society and the
purchaser of most of the remaining Seneca lands for the Holland Land
Company at the Treaty of Big Tree in 1797. Harrison’s experience with
Indian treaties began at Greenville as aide to the commander in chief,
General Anthony Wayne, another APS member. It appears that the
buying of America from the Indians was in considerable part concerted,
up to the time of the Mexican War in 1848, by a group of men
associated with the American Philosophical Society.
Two members of this group, in addition to Lewis and Clark, also
played a part in the development, under Jefferson’s guidance, of the
Society’s policy of encouraging systematic, planned research on American
Indian languages and cultures and the collection of written records and
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artifacts. Jefferson’s collection of vocabularies led to the work on Indian
languages by two early members: John Heckewelder, Moravian
missionary to the Delaware, and Peter Stephen Du Ponceau, who helped
launch comparative linguistics. Lewis Cass circulated a formal questionnaire on Indian customs and history among well-informed persons in his
Michigan Superintendency, and his protégé Henry Schoolcraft produced
comprehensive works on the Indians, partly to provide information for
the guidance of policy makers.11
The purchase of Indian land in the old Northwest Territory left a
troubled legacy. Although the treaties of cession were ostensibly
conducted according to protocol, they were often defective. Some
treaties were held under coercion, Indian signatories were not always
legitimate authorized representatives, tribes sold each other’s land, land
changed occupants over the years resulting in duplicate purchases of
the same tracts, boundaries were vaguely described before being
surveyed, financial details were misrepresented, and the language of
crucial articles was often ambiguous and subject to differing interpretations. Misunderstanding of the 1804 treaty with the Sac and Fox eventually led to the Black Hawk War of 1832, in which the regular Army
of the United States was mobilized to repel, and eventually destroy, an
“invasion” by several hundred Sac men, women, and children seeking
to re-occupy a village on the Rock River in Illinois that they believed
still belonged to them. Indian complaints about these old treaties
continued for generations, long after the tribes had been removed to
the Indian Territory in Oklahoma.
In recognition of the service of so many American Indians in the
armed services of the United States during World War II, in 1946
Congress created an Indian Claims Commission to settle hundreds of
civil suits against the United States. The Commission was not
authorized to overturn the treaties themselves, which were statutes at
law, but it could award financial compensation on the ground that the
United States as their legal guardian had failed to protect the interests
of its Indian wards in cessions of land. A Joint Efforts Group of law
firms representing plaintiffs originally from the old Northwest Territory (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin) was formed by
Felix Cohen, author of the government’s Handbook of Federal Indian
Law. I was employed in the 1950s by firms in the group to do
ethno-historical research on the location of villages and hunting
grounds, qualifications of Indian signatories, and circumstances
surrounding the treaties, and to testify before the Commission as an
expert witness. My files on these cases are in the Society’s Library.
The Commission found that many of the Indian nations had been
paid an “unconscionable consideration” for their lands. One of my
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cases (Docket 83) involved the Sac and Fox cession of the northwestern
third of Illinois, plus part of Wisconsin and Missouri north of St. Louis,
at the questionable Black Hawk War treaty negotiated in 1804 by
Harrison (who was pro-tem Governor of the Louisiana District while
Lewis and Clark were still exploring the West). The Commission found
that the United States had paid the Sac and Fox about one-half a cent
per acre for land worth, on the market at that time, about 54 cents per
acre. In 1973, 20 years after the Commission heard the case, the Sac
and Fox were awarded nearly $2,000,000 for the difference in value in
1804. Inflation and 150 years’ worth of interest were not counted.12
The End of Treaties
By the 1840s in America, a transformation was occurring in popular
sentiment regarding Indian affairs. No longer were policy and practice
in the hands of Jeffersonian deists espousing the political philosophy of
the Enlightenment. A new breed of public official took charge, many of
them military officers, responsive to the rising tide of evangelical Christianity, impatient with Indian treaties that became statutes binding on
all citizens, willing to use military force to transform pagan hunters
into Christian farmers. The old “single-purchaser” protocol was
compromised in land cessions that specified the assignment of tracts of
public land to railroad companies before the public had a chance to
buy it from the government. After the annexation of Texas, California,
and Mexican lands in the Southwest in the 1840s and the Civil War, in
which some of the southern tribes fought for the Confederacy, there
developed an endless round of Indian wars on the western frontier.
Neither the United States nor the Sioux and other tribal groups were
able to prevent their warriors from violating treaties that had established boundaries after questionable cessions of land.
In this atmosphere of deep mistrust, the era of Indian treaties came
to an end. In March 1871, Congress passed a law providing that “no
treaties shall hereafter be negotiated with any Indian tribe within the
United States as an independent nation or people.” There might indeed
be consultations and “agreements,” but decisions about cessions of land,
location of reservations, and tribal governance were thereafter made
either by act of Congress or by executive order of the President.13
It is an ironic twist of fate that this law ending the treaty period
was passed while a Seneca Indian, Ely Parker, a sachem chief in the
Grand Council of the Six Nations, held office as head of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. Parker had been a Union General during the Civil War
and was General Grant’s aide during Lee’s surrender at Appomatox.
Parker supported President Grant’s Peace Policy. He believed that to
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avert extinction, the western Indians had to end armed resistance and
adopt the White man’s ways, proposing the old plan, suggested in the
1830s, of eventually admitting an Indian Territory as a state. To curb
rampant corruption in the Indian service, he recommended that
clergymen be appointed as agents in the field. He even recommended
ending the treaty system, viewing it as inappropriate to the actual situation, in which the Indians were no longer sovereign nations with
central governments but loosely organized tribes dependent for survival
on the United States. But Christian zealots in Congress regarded Parker
as an untrustworthy Indian, a barbarian, too tolerant of native religious
beliefs, a member of the Masonic order. Parker, in an emergency situation, bent the rules in hastily purchasing food for starving Sioux. In
retaliation, he was charged with misappropriation of funds and
subjected to a Congressional investigation.
Parker can be thought of as a Native American Hamlet, prince of
an indigenous Denmark that he sought to save, entangled in a web of
intrigue and moral ambivalences. On the one hand, he favored the
peace-and-civilization vision of the Indians’ future, even if it had to be
supported by military force; he himself had served in an army fought
against Indians in the west. He criticized the current perverted practice
of Indian treaties, observing that recent treaties often worked to the
Indians’ disadvantage. The Indian tribes were not really sovereign, their
chiefs’ councils lacking the power to enforce compliance on dissenting
factions, whose forays simply led to massacres by the United States
army. And the treaties themselves were “like the handle to a jug. The
advantages and the power of execution are all on one side.”
No doubt the groundwork for this opinion had been formed by his
experience with the Seneca treaties of Buffalo Creek of 1838 and 1842,
in which a minority of chiefs and hangers-on, some made drunk, some
bribed, had signed away all of the Seneca reservations in New York in
exchange for promised lands in Kansas. As a result, the Seneca nation
split in two, the Tonawanda band remaining a member of the
Confederacy, and the southern reserves abandoning the system of clan
chiefs for an electoral process. Parker, and his friend Morgan and
Quaker allies, had lobbied in Washington to have the second treaty
modified to save Tonawanda (whose chiefs had not signed the treaties).
His own farm, managed by his sister Caroline, was not spared. Eventually the Tonawanda band was able to preserve a reduced reservation by
buying land back from the Ogden Land Company with money obtained
by abandoning claim to their trust land in Kansas.
More immediate crises must also have prompted his criticism of
treaties. On taking office, he was confronted by reports of a massacre
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of nearly 200 Piegan (Blackfoot) men, women, and children in a
peaceful village. In the summer of 1869, he invited the Sioux chief
Spotted Tail to meet with the president in Washington. Spotted Tail
rejected the Treaty of Fort Laramie (1868), in which the United States
purchased (or so it claimed) a large swath of Sioux territory in return
for a reservation along the Missouri River. Spotted Tail asserted that
the treaty document was a forgery and that the Sioux had not accepted
such a reservation. The Sioux wars, symbolized in history by Custer’s
“Last Stand” (1876) and the massacre at Wounded Knee (1890), were
an outcome of the collapse of the old treaty protocol.
Assailed by racist enemies in Washington, threatened with death by
Seneca traditionalists, and exhausted by days of Congressional testimony, Parker suffered a medical crisis and was bed-ridden for weeks.
Although Congress exonerated him, he resigned his post in August 1871,
6 months after the anti-treaty law was passed. He left public life, lived on
in straitened circumstances, and was buried in prestigious Forest Lawn
Cemetery in Buffalo, next to Red Jacket. He lies on land torn from the
Seneca by the infamous Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which in his youth he
had fought to overturn. Some of Parker’s papers, including a draft of his
letter of resignation, now rest in the Society’s Library.14
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